alterlab-rdkit
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation in
SKILL.mdrecommends using the Pythonpicklemodule to save and load molecular objects for performance optimization. Deserializing data usingpickleis inherently unsafe because it can allow the execution of arbitrary code if the source file is untrusted or has been tampered with. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process molecular data from external files (SDF, SMILES) and user-provided strings. This functionality establishes a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context through molecular parsing functions in
SKILL.mdand the provided command-line scripts:molecular_properties.py,similarity_search.py, andsubstructure_filter.py. - Boundary markers: The skill does not employ specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" markers when reading data from molecular files or SMILES strings.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to read and write files to the local file system (via
SDMolSupplierandSDWriter) and execute shell commands via the suggesteduv runusage. - Sanitization: The skill relies on RDKit's standard chemical sanitization, which validates chemical structures (valence, aromaticity) but does not filter for embedded natural language instructions.
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