alterlab-scientific-slides

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied text prompts and attached images in scripts/generate_slide_image_ai.py, which are then sent to an external AI service. This creates an attack surface where malicious instructions could be embedded in the data processed by the agent.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided prompt string and image attachments processed in scripts/generate_slide_image.py and scripts/generate_slide_image_ai.py.
  • Boundary markers: The generate_slide_image_ai.py script wraps user input within specific instructional blocks (FULL_SLIDE_GUIDELINES and VISUAL_ONLY_GUIDELINES) to guide the model's behavior.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via subprocess (e.g., calling pdflatex in scripts/validate_presentation.py and script orchestration in scripts/generate_slide_image.py) and perform network operations via the requests library.
  • Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering is performed on the user-provided text prompts before inclusion in the AI model request.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses subprocess calls to handle core tasks like LaTeX compilation and script orchestration.
  • Evidence: scripts/validate_presentation.py executes pdflatex to compile and validate LaTeX Beamer presentations.
  • Evidence: scripts/generate_slide_image.py uses subprocess.run to invoke the internal generate_slide_image_ai.py script.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill makes network requests to an external service to perform slide generation and review.
  • Evidence: scripts/generate_slide_image_ai.py uses the requests library to communicate with https://openrouter.ai/api/v1 for image generation and quality assessment.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 25, 2026, 02:37 PM