alterlab-scientific-slides
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied text prompts and attached images in
scripts/generate_slide_image_ai.py, which are then sent to an external AI service. This creates an attack surface where malicious instructions could be embedded in the data processed by the agent. - Ingestion points: User-provided
promptstring and imageattachmentsprocessed inscripts/generate_slide_image.pyandscripts/generate_slide_image_ai.py. - Boundary markers: The
generate_slide_image_ai.pyscript wraps user input within specific instructional blocks (FULL_SLIDE_GUIDELINESandVISUAL_ONLY_GUIDELINES) to guide the model's behavior. - Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via
subprocess(e.g., callingpdflatexinscripts/validate_presentation.pyand script orchestration inscripts/generate_slide_image.py) and perform network operations via therequestslibrary. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering is performed on the user-provided text prompts before inclusion in the AI model request.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses subprocess calls to handle core tasks like LaTeX compilation and script orchestration.
- Evidence:
scripts/validate_presentation.pyexecutespdflatexto compile and validate LaTeX Beamer presentations. - Evidence:
scripts/generate_slide_image.pyusessubprocess.runto invoke the internalgenerate_slide_image_ai.pyscript. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill makes network requests to an external service to perform slide generation and review.
- Evidence:
scripts/generate_slide_image_ai.pyuses therequestslibrary to communicate withhttps://openrouter.ai/api/v1for image generation and quality assessment.
Audit Metadata