alterlab-yok-tez
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to install and execute the
yoktez-mcptool directly from a third-party GitHub repository using theuvxcommand (uvx --from git+https://github.com/saidsurucu/yoktez-mcp yoktez-mcp). This involves fetching and running code from an external repository not affiliated with the skill author. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on several external services and endpoints to function, including a hosted connector at
yoktezmcp.fastmcp.appand a community mirror for metadata attezara.org. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted data from the National Thesis Center database, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Thesis metadata including titles, keywords, and abstracts retrieved via the
search_yok_tez_detailedtool. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions do not define clear delimiters or escaping mechanisms to separate retrieved thesis content from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
Bash,Write, andEdittools while processing the untrusted data. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering logic is provided to validate or clean the content of the thesis records before they are interpolated into the prompt.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to execute a local Python helper script (scripts/yok_tez_query.py) to perform query normalization and format citations.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata