alterlab-pra-pr-writer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external, untrusted data which creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection, though no specific exploits are present.
- Ingestion points: The skill instructions direct the agent to search the web for current news hooks and media directories, and to read existing project files for context (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or delimiters to separate untrusted data from the agent's core instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to search the web, read files, and write new markdown files to the project directory (SKILL.md).
- Sanitization: There are no mentioned mechanisms for sanitizing or escaping content retrieved from web searches or local files before it is processed or written to new deliverables.
Audit Metadata