game-team-orchestrator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and acting upon untrusted external data within a game development repository.
- Ingestion points: Processes
feature-descriptionfrom user input, reads Game Design Documents (GDD) within thedesign/directory, and monitors Git commit history and external issue trackers during sprint planning. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to use delimiters or specific safety wrappers when interpolating this external content into the agent's context.
- Capability inventory: Access to
Bash,Write,Edit,Read,Glob,Grep, and the ability to chain and invoke other platform skills (e.g.,/game-brainstorm,/game-start,/game-launch). - Sanitization: Absent. The instructions do not define any validation, escaping, or filtering for the data read from the project environment.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is granted
BashandWritetool access to perform state management and project updates. - Evidence: The skill instructions explicitly command the agent to initialize and update JSON state files in
production/session-state/and update project metadata files likevelocity.jsonusing the shell and file-write capabilities.
Audit Metadata