consensus-code-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interpolates the
$ARGUMENTSvariable directly into shell commands withinreferences/command.md, includinggit diff,git show, andgit log. If the user input is not properly sanitized by the agent, this could allow for command injection by appending shell metacharacters. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is instructed in
SKILL.mdto use a specific configuration file located at~/.codex/consensus.json. Accessing hidden configuration files within the user's home directory is a sensitive operation as these files often contain API keys, session tokens, or other credentials required for multi-model interactions. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted code and diff data from external repositories.
- Ingestion points: Source code, git diffs, and commit messages are read using git commands defined in
references/command.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions attempt to use markdown horizontal rules (
---) to delimit the review target, which provides minimal protection against adversarial content. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands (
git) and read files throughout the repository. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the code content before it is processed by the lead reviewer or external models.
Audit Metadata