consensus-code-review

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 26, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interpolates the $ARGUMENTS variable directly into shell commands within references/command.md, including git diff, git show, and git log. If the user input is not properly sanitized by the agent, this could allow for command injection by appending shell metacharacters.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is instructed in SKILL.md to use a specific configuration file located at ~/.codex/consensus.json. Accessing hidden configuration files within the user's home directory is a sensitive operation as these files often contain API keys, session tokens, or other credentials required for multi-model interactions.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted code and diff data from external repositories.
  • Ingestion points: Source code, git diffs, and commit messages are read using git commands defined in references/command.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions attempt to use markdown horizontal rules (---) to delimit the review target, which provides minimal protection against adversarial content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands (git) and read files throughout the repository.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the code content before it is processed by the lead reviewer or external models.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 26, 2026, 04:48 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — consensus-code-review