auto-improve
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to manage code changes and repository state.
- Evidence includes the use of
gitfor branching, committing, and pushing changes to thealvarovillalbaa/agent-suiterepository. - Evidence includes the use of the GitHub CLI (
gh) to programmatically create Pull Requests with summaries of improvements. - The
eval loopandautoresearchsub-flows execute scripts and testing tools (e.g.,pytest,npm run build,python scripts/run_experiment.py) to measure and optimize file metrics. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation describes and encourages the use of the
!commandsyntax withinSKILL.mdfiles to inject dynamic shell output into the agent's context at load time. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) due to its core function of autonomously mutating its own instructions and memory files based on external data.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the system via 'discovery passes' of conversation history, user directions, and repository documentation files.
- Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions when interpolating gathered evidence into the prompts used for generating file mutations.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including filesystem write access, shell command execution, and the ability to push code to remote repositories.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or strict validation of the ingested evidence before it is used to propose and apply changes to the agent's logic or memory.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The evaluation dashboard generated by the skill fetches external resources for visualization.
- Evidence: The
dashboard.htmltemplate loads the Chart.js library from a well-known CDN (jsdelivr).
Audit Metadata