communication-style

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 5, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it extracts persistent rules from untrusted text samples.
  • Ingestion points: Processes writing samples provided by the user to capture voice summaries and style constraints (references/writing-style-learning.md).
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the analyzed samples.
  • Capability inventory: Extracted style rules directly influence the agent's drafting behavior and personalization output (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: The skill lacks technical sanitization for ingested text, though it notes best practices to avoid learning from boilerplate or signatures.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Documentation in SKILL.md instructs users to execute a Python script (scripts/install-external-skills.py) to install external components. The script's logic is not available in the skill package for verification.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references an external registry located at ../../../references/external-skills.yaml and lists external skills like unslop and stop-slop for installation via the aforementioned script.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jul 5, 2026, 04:25 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — communication-style