communication-style
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it extracts persistent rules from untrusted text samples.
- Ingestion points: Processes writing samples provided by the user to capture voice summaries and style constraints (
references/writing-style-learning.md). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the analyzed samples.
- Capability inventory: Extracted style rules directly influence the agent's drafting behavior and personalization output (
SKILL.md). - Sanitization: The skill lacks technical sanitization for ingested text, though it notes best practices to avoid learning from boilerplate or signatures.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Documentation in
SKILL.mdinstructs users to execute a Python script (scripts/install-external-skills.py) to install external components. The script's logic is not available in the skill package for verification. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references an external registry located at
../../../references/external-skills.yamland lists external skills likeunslopandstop-slopfor installation via the aforementioned script.
Audit Metadata