context-engineering
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains instructions for the agent to execute a shell commandpython3 scripts/install-external-skills.pywith specific arguments to extend the agent's functionality at runtime. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a workflow for installing "external skills" based on a registry file (
external-skills.yaml). This pattern facilitates the retrieval and execution of external code that is not part of the analyzed skill package, which can lead to the execution of unverified logic. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary focus is "Context Engineering," which involves a "Context Assembly Flow" that specifically includes preprocessing uploaded files and scraping URLs. This ingestion of untrusted external content into the agent's prompt context represents a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points:
ContextAssemblyService.preprocess_inputs(files, links), URL scraping functions, and external API responses via MCP (Model Context Protocol). - Boundary markers: The documentation mentions the use of XML-style
system_blocktags for System Prompt Learning (SPL) blocks. - Capability inventory: The skill documentation references tools such as
create_file,update_profile,update_job_posting, and various vector store query capabilities. - Sanitization: The skill mentions that BDI (Beliefs-Desires-Intentions) states are HTML-escaped and length-limited, but does not provide comprehensive sanitization details for scraped web content.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The "SPL Processor" and
build_dynamic_instructions()mechanisms described in the memory documentation allow for the dynamic assembly and injection of instructions into the system prompt at runtime, based on session variables and external signals.
Audit Metadata