multi-agent
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's orchestration logic involves executing shell commands to manage agent sessions. In
references/agents/orchestrate.yaml, thekickoffworkflow uses a shell command (bun skills/orchestrate/scripts/cli.ts kickoff "<goal>") that interpolates the user-provided goal directly into the command line, creating a surface for command injection if input is not properly handled by the underlying tool. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user input (goals and queries) to generate prompts for sub-agents, as seen in the templates in
references/subagent-prompt-templates.md. This represents an indirect prompt injection surface where malicious instructions in a goal could potentially influence the behavior of worker agents. - Ingestion points: User input for
<goal>and task requirements enters the context inreferences/agents/orchestrate.yamlandreferences/subagent-prompt-templates.md. - Boundary markers: The prompt templates utilize placeholders like
<requirements>but do not consistently employ strong boundary markers or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes subprocess execution (
bun,python) and file system operations. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or input validation logic is present in the provided skill instructions.
Audit Metadata