agenthub
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several scripts (
result_ranker.py,session_manager.py,dag_analyzer.py,dry_run.py) utilizesubprocess.runto interact with the Git CLI, execute user-defined benchmarking commands, and perform internal validation checks. While these are core functional requirements for a git-based orchestration tool, they involve shell execution (shell=Trueinresult_ranker.py) of commands defined in the session configuration. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's architecture involves a coordinator agent reading and evaluating output from parallel sub-agents, which creates a potential vulnerability to indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The coordinator reads agent-generated markdown posts from
.agenthub/board/results/and analyzes Git diffs (git diff base...agent-branch) produced by sub-agents. - Boundary markers: The coordinator instructions in
hub-coordinator.mdandskills/eval/SKILL.mdlack explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded within agent-generated content. - Capability inventory: The coordinator has significant capabilities, including spawning new agents via the
Agenttool, executing shell commands through Python scripts, and modifying the local filesystem. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the sub-agent output before it is processed by the coordinator session.
Audit Metadata