parallel-task-tmux
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/tmux_run_codex_task.shinvokes worker agents using thecodex execcommand with the--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxflag. This configuration explicitly disables all security guardrails, including the execution sandbox and user approval for sensitive operations, allowing the sub-agent to execute any shell command on the host system. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates prompt files for each task at
$RUN_ROOT/prompts/<TASK_ID>.mdbased on a user-provided plan. These generated scripts are then executed via the unsandboxedcodexcommand, meaning that any code or commands produced during the task execution are run with the full privileges of the host user. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its processing of external plan files without proper isolation.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads and parses a task plan from a local
plan.mdfile as described in the Plan Parsing section ofSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear boundaries or use delimiters to prevent the sub-agent from following instructions embedded within the plan data.
- Capability inventory: The worker agents have full system access via
codex execwithout sandboxing, as seen inscripts/tmux_run_codex_task.sh. - Sanitization: No sanitization is performed on the plan content before it is interpolated into the worker prompts.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata