video-router
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on a local Python script (
scripts/avs.py) to perform its core routing and search logic. It also instructs the agent to useffprobefor technical metadata inspection of media files. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill manages a catalog of 193 'upstream' skill paths. This creates an attack surface where untrusted data (the content of those upstream skills) enters the agent's context.
- Ingestion points: Information is ingested from
references/registry/retrieval.jsonland external URLs linked inreferences/catalog.md. - Boundary markers: Present. The
SKILL.mdand various guide files (e.g.,references/models/wan.md,references/quality.md) explicitly instruct the agent to treat external content as untrusted source material and never execute unreviewed commands. - Capability inventory:
python3 scripts/avs.py(logic and routing) andffprobe(metadata extraction). - Sanitization: Relies on instructional guardrails and explicit 'preflight' review steps rather than automated filtering.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses a structured workflow system (
references/registry/workflows.json) that defines sequences of actions for the agent to take. These instructions influence agent behavior in subsequent turns of the conversation.
Audit Metadata