context7-efficient
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The helper utility
scripts/mcp-client.pyexecutes the command string provided to the--stdioargument usingsubprocess.Popen(..., shell=True). This is a dangerous pattern that permits arbitrary code execution if the input is not strictly validated.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestration scriptscripts/fetch-docs.shandscripts/fetch-raw.share vulnerable to command injection. They interpolate user-provided parameters like--librarydirectly into shell command strings used to invokemcp-client.py. By crafting a malicious library name (e.g., using escaped quotes and additional flags), an attacker can inject a new--stdioargument to override the intended command and execute arbitrary shell commands.- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill usesnpx -y @upstash/context7-mcpto download and execute the Context7 MCP server from Upstash at runtime. While Upstash is a recognized service, runtime installation of external packages introduces a supply chain risk.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes documentation fetched from an external API (Context7) and returns it to the agent. - Ingestion points: Documentation text fetched via
fetch-docs.shandmcp-client.py. - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not use delimiters or warnings to separate external content from instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell scripts and arbitrary commands via the
mcp-client.pywrapper. - Sanitization: Absent; the skill uses
awkandgrepfor filtering content but does not sanitize or escape the data to prevent instructions from influencing the agent.- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically constructs and executes shell command strings at runtime through its internal MCP client implementation.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata