aider-delegate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
relay.mjsscript utilizes thenode:child_processmodule (specificallyspawnandexecFileSync) to run theaiderCLI andgitcommands. This is the core functionality required to delegate tasks and track repository changes. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
applyFleetLanefunction inrelay.mjsattempts to execute a local JavaScript file located at../../delegate-setup/scripts/lane.mjs. This facilitates integration between sibling skills within the delegate ecosystem but relies on the local availability of that script. - [SAFE]: The skill implementation significantly reduces the attack surface by pinning restrictive Aider configuration flags by default, including
--no-suggest-shell-commands(to prevent execution of unreviewed shell code),--no-detect-urls(to prevent unauthorized outbound network fetches), and--no-analytics(to disable telemetry). - [SAFE]: The orchestrator explicitly disables Aider's autonomous committing features (
--no-auto-commitsand--no-dirty-commits). This ensures that the tool cannot unilaterally modify the repository history and that all changes remain in the working tree for a mandatory review-and-land workflow. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes a 'brief' containing instructions that are passed to an LLM-driven agent (Aider). While this creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, the skill mitigates this through extensive documentation on defining file-access boundaries and establishing a manual verification process where all implementation work must pass local project gates before being committed.
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