claude-delegate

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts/relay.mjs script executes the claude CLI and git as subprocesses using Node.js built-ins.
  • Evidence: The script uses spawn and execFileSync to launch the claude binary and perform git operations in scripts/relay.mjs.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a proxy, taking an unvalidated task description ("brief") and passing it to a powerful child agent with shell and filesystem access.
  • Ingestion points: The readBrief function in scripts/relay.mjs reads the brief from a file or stdin, which is then used in the dispatch function.
  • Boundary markers: The skill suggests using XML-style tags in references/writing-the-brief.md to structure the brief, but the scripts/relay.mjs script does not programmatically enforce or validate these boundaries.
  • Capability inventory: The toolSurface function in scripts/relay.mjs defines a toolset including Read,Glob,Grep,Edit,Write,Bash, and PowerShell for the child agent.
  • Sanitization: Absent; the dispatch function in scripts/relay.mjs pipes the raw, unescaped brief text directly to the child agent's stdin.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script dynamically resolves the path to the claude executable by searching the system PATH and builds the command-line arguments at runtime.
  • Evidence: Logic in the resolveClaudeLauncher and launchSpec functions in scripts/relay.mjs.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The documentation suggests that users may need to run the delegation with escalated sandbox permissions to bypass security restrictions on credential access.
  • Evidence: The "Prerequisites" section of SKILL.md advises running the dispatch "with that sandbox escalated or outside it" if keychain access is blocked.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 14, 2026, 10:51 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — claude-delegate