claude-delegate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/relay.mjsscript executes theclaudeCLI andgitas subprocesses using Node.js built-ins. - Evidence: The script uses
spawnandexecFileSyncto launch theclaudebinary and perform git operations inscripts/relay.mjs. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a proxy, taking an unvalidated task description ("brief") and passing it to a powerful child agent with shell and filesystem access.
- Ingestion points: The
readBrieffunction inscripts/relay.mjsreads the brief from a file or stdin, which is then used in thedispatchfunction. - Boundary markers: The skill suggests using XML-style tags in
references/writing-the-brief.mdto structure the brief, but thescripts/relay.mjsscript does not programmatically enforce or validate these boundaries. - Capability inventory: The
toolSurfacefunction inscripts/relay.mjsdefines a toolset includingRead,Glob,Grep,Edit,Write,Bash, andPowerShellfor the child agent. - Sanitization: Absent; the
dispatchfunction inscripts/relay.mjspipes the raw, unescaped brief text directly to the child agent's stdin. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script dynamically resolves the path to the
claudeexecutable by searching the system PATH and builds the command-line arguments at runtime. - Evidence: Logic in the
resolveClaudeLauncherandlaunchSpecfunctions inscripts/relay.mjs. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The documentation suggests that users may need to run the delegation with escalated sandbox permissions to bypass security restrictions on credential access.
- Evidence: The "Prerequisites" section of
SKILL.mdadvises running the dispatch "with that sandbox escalated or outside it" if keychain access is blocked.
Audit Metadata