cline-delegate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing external binaries, specifically the
clineCLI andgit, through Node.js subprocesses to perform its primary function of code task delegation and result verification. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
relay.mjsscript dynamically constructs command-line arguments to launch theclinetool. On Windows systems, it usesshell:truebut implements a strict alphanumeric regex (SAFE_TOKEN) to validate provider and model identifiers, preventing shell injection vulnerabilities. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as an instruction relay, creating a surface where malicious user-provided task 'briefs' could influence the behavior of the secondary
clineagent. - Ingestion points: The relay script in
scripts/relay.mjsingests arbitrary text instructions from a file path specified by--briefor fromstdin. - Boundary markers: While the
writing-the-brief.mddocumentation recommends using structured XML-like tags (e.g.,<task>,<action_safety>), the relay script does not programmatically enforce or wrap the user input with these boundaries. - Capability inventory: The secondary agent being briefed (
cline) possesses powerful capabilities, including the ability to execute shell commands and edit files within the workspace. - Sanitization: The relay script performs no sanitization or filtering of the brief content, acting as a transparent delivery mechanism for the instructions.
Audit Metadata