cursor-delegate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill operates as an orchestration layer that ingests a 'brief' (task instructions) and passes it to a separate agent for implementation, creating an inherent injection surface.
- Ingestion points: The instructions are read from stdin or a file in
scripts/relay.mjsand provided to thecursor-agentCLI. - Boundary markers: The documentation in
references/writing-the-brief.mdrecommends using XML-like blocks (e.g.,<task>,<verification_loop>) to structure instructions, but these are not technical security boundaries. - Capability inventory:
scripts/relay.mjsinvokescursor-agentandgitviachild_processmethods. Thecursor-agentimplementer has the capability to write to the filesystem and execute shell commands (facilitated by the--forceflag). - Sanitization: The relay script does not perform content-based sanitization or filtering of the brief text before passing it to the child process.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/relay.mjsscript executes system commands includingcursor-agent,git, andtaskkill(on Windows) using Node.jschild_processfunctions to manage the implementation lifecycle. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation directs users to install the
cursor-agentCLI from its official domain atcursor.com/cli, which is a well-known service.
Audit Metadata