omp-delegate
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's relay script (
scripts/relay.mjs) executes external binaries including theompCLI,git(for status reporting), and the systemtaskkillutility on Windows. It uses thenode:child_processmodule to spawn these processes. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation (
SKILL.md) directs users to install the@oh-my-pi/pi-coding-agentpackage viabunor fromhttps://omp.sh. This package and domain originate from a third-party source not identified as a trusted vendor or well-known service, presenting a supply-chain risk. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: If the
--laneflag is utilized, the relay script dynamically resolves and executes a Node.js script located at a relative path (../../delegate-setup/scripts/lane.mjs). This creates a functional dependency on external code residing outside the skill's directory. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes task 'briefs' and workspace files, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious data could influence the implementer's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Task briefs provided via stdin or file to
relay.mjs; workspace file content read by theompimplementer. - Boundary markers: The documentation recommends using XML-style tags (e.g.,
<task>,<action_safety>) within briefs to structure instructions. - Capability inventory: The spawned
ompprocess has broad permissions to read and write files in the local workspace and can execute shell commands via its own internal tools. - Sanitization: The relay script implements token validation using a regular expression (
SAFE_TOKEN) for specific command-line arguments to prevent flag injection, though the main task brief is passed through without sanitization.
Audit Metadata