debate-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill analyzes untrusted content from GitHub Pull Requests and GitLab Merge Requests, which can contain malicious instructions intended to mislead the reviewing models.
- Ingestion points: PR title, body, commits, and linked issue content are fetched in
scripts/lib/forge.mjsandscripts/review-pr.mjs. - Boundary markers: Ingested data is interpolated into prompt templates without using specific delimiters or safety instructions to separate untrusted data from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The orchestrator can post comments and findings back to the PR/MR via the
ghorglabtools. - Sanitization: The skill validates the structure of the LLM responses against a JSON schema but does not sanitize the input PR content.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Shell commands for
git,gh, andglabare executed usingspawnSyncinscripts/lib/shell.mjs. These are used for project-related tasks like cloning, viewing PRs, and posting comments. The implementation uses argument arrays to prevent shell injection. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Local scripts for model interaction (delegates) are located and executed at runtime based on the skill's configuration and CLI flags in
scripts/lib/dispatch.mjs. This involves constructing paths and spawning newnodeprocesses. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches source code by cloning repositories from GitHub and GitLab to a local cache folder (~/.cache/debate-review/clones). These operations utilize official domains of well-known version control services.
Audit Metadata