building-client-plugins
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the creation of plugins that ingest untrusted thread data (such as thread titles and project names) and pass it to the
amp.jevAPI for processing. This creates a surface where malicious content in thread data could influence the behavior of the plugin or the LLM output. - Ingestion points: The
threadobject passed to the plugin's entrypoint inclient/index.mjscontains fields liketitleandprojectderived from the user environment. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the
stateorquestionssent toamp.jev. - Capability inventory: Plugins have DOM access, authenticated network access, and the ability to modify the client UI (e.g.,
amp.sidebar.setOrbColorRule). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the ingested thread data is mentioned before it is processed by the logic or sent to the
jevservice. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation instructs the agent to use the
ampCLI for repository management and to configure Git with a shell-executing credential helper (!amp git-credential-helper). These are platform-specific tools provided by the vendor for authenticated workflows.
Audit Metadata