ai-seo
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to analyze external websites, competitive content, and third-party platform results (e.g., G2, Reddit, LinkedIn). This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in those untrusted external sources could attempt to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Analysis of user-provided URLs and competitor pages to check for content extractability and citation presence (SKILL.md, references/platform-ranking-factors.md).
- Boundary markers: There are no specific instructions for the agent to use delimiters or safety wrappers when processing external content to prevent command interpretation.
- Capability inventory: The skill operates in an environment where the agent may have access to tools for web search, URL fetching, and terminal execution.
- Sanitization: The skill lacks explicit instructions for sanitizing or escaping content fetched from the web before it is processed by the agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill recommends using various third-party CLI tools and services that are not on the trusted vendor list, such as
afdocsby Fern and monitoring platforms like Otterly AI, Peec AI, and ZipTie. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation provides multiple shell command templates (e.g.,
curlfor checking robots headers,npxfor site readiness audits). An agent with terminal access could attempt to execute these commands autonomously while performing a requested audit, leading to unverified code execution if the package sources are not properly vetted.
Audit Metadata