agent-browser
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the use of the
beltCLI tool to perform its browser automation tasks. The included templates are Bash scripts that utilize this tool to manage sessions and interactions. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill provides an
executefunction that runs arbitrary JavaScript code within the context of the browser session. This is documented for tasks like extracting page titles, cookies, and structured data. - Evidence:
references/commands.mdandtemplates/capture-workflow.shdemonstrate the use ofexecutefor running code likedocument.body.innerTextanddocument.cookie. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: As the skill allows an agent to process content from arbitrary URLs, it is vulnerable to instructions embedded in web pages that may attempt to manipulate the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Web page content accessed via the
open,snapshot, andinteractfunctions, as well as the output from executed JavaScript. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or warnings to separate untrusted web content from the agent's internal logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform actions like clicking, typing, file uploading, and JavaScript execution, which could be triggered by instructions found in the ingested data.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or sanitization being applied to the data retrieved from the browser sessions.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and provides instructions for installing external components, specifically the
belt-sh/clitool, and links to installation guidelines on GitHub. - Evidence: The installation instructions in
SKILL.mdpoint tohttps://raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills/refs/heads/main/cli-install.md.
Audit Metadata