ai-avatar-video
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input from user-provided text and external URLs, which represents a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests
voice_scripttext and media URLs (image,audio) for various AI model parameters inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Input data is structured as JSON, but there are no explicit instructions or delimiters used to separate user data from agent instructions or to ignore potential commands embedded in the inputs.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Bashtool (restricted to thebeltCLI) to perform network operations and write output files. - Sanitization: No input validation or sanitization of the external content is implemented in the documented workflows.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches configuration and installation guidelines from the vendor's official GitHub repository (
inference-sh/skills). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Utilizes the
beltCLI via theBashtool to execute AI models. The skill's tool access is restricted specifically to thebeltcommand scope.
Audit Metadata