ai-content-pipeline
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions frequently utilize the
Bashtool to run thebeltCLI. This involves executing commands likebelt app runto interact with external AI services (FLUX, Wan, Kokoro, etc.), which is the primary intended function of the skill. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes a pipeline where user-provided text (prompts, scripts, and blog content) is interpolated into CLI commands and processed by external AI models.
- Ingestion points: User-supplied strings are ingested into the
promptandinputfields of thebelt app runcommands as demonstrated inSKILL.mdexamples. - Boundary markers: The skill uses JSON structure (
--input '{...}') to delimit inputs, which provides some structural separation but does not prevent malicious instructions within the strings themselves. - Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Bash(belt *)tool to execute shell commands, perform media merging viainfsh/media-merger, and handle file redirects (e.g.,> script.json). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of explicit input sanitization or validation within the skill instructions; it relies on the downstream AI models and the CLI tool's own handling.
Audit Metadata