ai-voice-cloning

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied text through various Text-to-Speech (TTS) models, which is a common vulnerability surface for indirect injection.
  • Ingestion points: The prompt and text fields within the JSON payload for belt app run commands in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses JSON formatting for tool input, providing structural delimitation, though no explicit instructions are provided to the agent to ignore potentially malicious content within the user-provided text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses the Bash tool to execute belt commands for voice generation and media merging.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the input text is documented.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of the belt CLI tool via the system shell to interact with the inference.sh platform. The allowed-tools configuration in the frontmatter correctly restricts the Bash tool to only execute belt commands, adhering to the principle of least privilege.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 8, 2026, 10:25 AM