ai-voice-cloning
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied text through various Text-to-Speech (TTS) models, which is a common vulnerability surface for indirect injection.
- Ingestion points: The
promptandtextfields within the JSON payload forbelt app runcommands inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill uses JSON formatting for tool input, providing structural delimitation, though no explicit instructions are provided to the agent to ignore potentially malicious content within the user-provided text.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Bashtool to executebeltcommands for voice generation and media merging. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the input text is documented.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of the
beltCLI tool via the system shell to interact with the inference.sh platform. Theallowed-toolsconfiguration in the frontmatter correctly restricts theBashtool to only executebeltcommands, adhering to the principle of least privilege.
Audit Metadata