competitor-teardown
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to install an external CLI tool (
belt-sh/cli) vianpxand references installation scripts hosted atraw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills. These sources are outside of the predefined trusted repositories. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill leverages the
beltCLI to execute various tasks, including browser automation (infsh/agent-browser) and search operations. Theallowed-toolsmetadata restricts Bash usage to this specific command. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: A Python script using
matplotlibis embedded within the instructions to generate positioning maps. This code is executed at runtime via theinfsh/python-executorapplication. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: The skill uses
tavily/search-assistant,exa/search, andtavily/extractto pull content from competitor websites, review platforms (G2, Capterra), and news articles into the agent's context (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings are implemented for the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to
infsh/python-executorandinfsh/agent-browser(documented in SKILL.md). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the external search results is described.
- Note: Processing untrusted external data from the web creates a vulnerability surface where malicious instructions embedded in websites could influence the agent's behavior.
Audit Metadata