competitor-teardown

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to install an external CLI tool (belt-sh/cli) via npx and references installation scripts hosted at raw.githubusercontent.com/inference-sh/skills. These sources are outside of the predefined trusted repositories.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill leverages the belt CLI to execute various tasks, including browser automation (infsh/agent-browser) and search operations. The allowed-tools metadata restricts Bash usage to this specific command.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: A Python script using matplotlib is embedded within the instructions to generate positioning maps. This code is executed at runtime via the infsh/python-executor application.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
  • Ingestion points: The skill uses tavily/search-assistant, exa/search, and tavily/extract to pull content from competitor websites, review platforms (G2, Capterra), and news articles into the agent's context (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings are implemented for the ingested data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to infsh/python-executor and infsh/agent-browser (documented in SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the external search results is described.
  • Note: Processing untrusted external data from the web creates a vulnerability surface where malicious instructions embedded in websites could influence the agent's behavior.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 8, 2026, 10:25 AM