p-video-avatar
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied data that is passed directly to the
beltCLI, creating a surface for indirect instructions to influence the model's output or behavior. - Ingestion points: User-provided strings for
voice_script,video_prompt, andvoice_promptparameters inSKILL.mdexamples. - Boundary markers: None identified. There are no instructions to the agent to treat these inputs as untrusted data or to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
Bash(belt *)to execute commands on the system. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the input strings is performed before they are interpolated into shell commands.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the
Bashtool to executebeltCLI commands, which is the primary mechanism for its functionality. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external resources and installation scripts.
- Fetches installation instructions from the
inference-shGitHub repository. - Instructs the user to add the
belt-sh/cliand otherinference-shskills vianpx.
Audit Metadata