skills/anasadda/skills/p-video-avatar/Gen Agent Trust Hub

p-video-avatar

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied data that is passed directly to the belt CLI, creating a surface for indirect instructions to influence the model's output or behavior.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided strings for voice_script, video_prompt, and voice_prompt parameters in SKILL.md examples.
  • Boundary markers: None identified. There are no instructions to the agent to treat these inputs as untrusted data or to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses Bash(belt *) to execute commands on the system.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the input strings is performed before they are interpolated into shell commands.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the Bash tool to execute belt CLI commands, which is the primary mechanism for its functionality.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external resources and installation scripts.
  • Fetches installation instructions from the inference-sh GitHub repository.
  • Instructs the user to add the belt-sh/cli and other inference-sh skills via npx.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 8, 2026, 10:26 AM