python-executor
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill is explicitly designed to execute arbitrary Python code provided via the
codeinput parameter. While the documentation states this occurs in a safe sandboxed environment, this capability represents a high-impact operation where the agent acts as a proxy for script execution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes the
beltcommand-line interface via a shell environment to interact with theinference.shplatform. Theallowed-toolsconfiguration correctly restricts this access to thebeltcommand prefix. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instructions direct users to install the
belt-sh/clitool usingnpxand reference external setup documentation hosted on GitHub. These resources are part of the primary infrastructure required for the skill's functionality. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests and executes code derived from the agent's context.
- Ingestion points: The
codefield in the input schema withinSKILL.mdaccepts arbitrary strings for execution. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters provided to warn the agent about potentially malicious instructions embedded in the code it is asked to run.
- Capability inventory: The environment includes powerful libraries for network access (
requests,selenium,playwright), file system interaction within the sandbox (outputs/directory), and data processing. - Sanitization: The skill relies entirely on the external platform's sandboxing logic; there is no local validation or sanitization of the Python code before it is passed to the shell.
Audit Metadata