brand
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The script
scripts/inject-brand-context.cjsreads content fromdocs/brand-guidelines.mdand interpolates it into a structured text block intended for system prompt injection. If an attacker modifies the markdown file to include malicious instructions, the agent may follow them. - Ingestion points:
docs/brand-guidelines.mdis read byscripts/inject-brand-context.cjs. - Boundary markers: The script wraps the content in headers like
BRAND CONTEXT:andVISUAL IDENTITY:, but it lacks explicit 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings for the AI. - Capability inventory: The skill scripts have the capability to write files to the project directory (
design-tokens.json,design-tokens.css) and execute commands viaexecFileSync. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on the extracted text before it is placed in the prompt.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
execFileSyncinscripts/sync-brand-to-tokens.cjsto run a Node.js script. While it uses a list of arguments rather than a shell string, it represents a command execution capability. Additionally, the test scriptscripts/tests/test_sync_brand_to_tokens.pyusessubprocess.runto execute Node.js commands during testing. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: In
scripts/sync-brand-to-tokens.cjs, the script path forGENERATE_TOKENS_SCRIPTis dynamically computed at runtime usingpath.resolveto target a sibling skill (design-system). The script then executes this external file usingexecFileSync.
Audit Metadata