infinitetalk
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runto executeffmpegfor extracting audio from video files. This is a standard and safe practice as it uses a list of arguments to prevent command injection. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill guides users to download large model weights (approx. 30GB) from Hugging Face repositories including
Wan-AI,TencentGameMate,MeiGen-AI, andhexgrad. These are well-known sources for AI model distribution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied text for TTS (Text-to-Speech) and media files (images/audio/video). While this represents a theoretical ingestion point for malicious content, it is restricted to the primary function of media generation and does not have capabilities for downstream privilege escalation or data exfiltration.
- Ingestion points: Text inputs via
--textargument and media files via--input_pathand--audio_pathinscripts/infer_infinitetalk.py. - Boundary markers: None explicitly present in the wrapper script.
- Capability inventory: Uses
ffmpegfor media conversion and standard AI libraries (torch, transformers, diffusers) for inference. - Sanitization: Input text is processed by standard NLP tokenizers; media files are processed by established libraries like OpenCV, Librosa, and FFmpeg.
Audit Metadata