PDF Processing Pro
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill suggests installing several well-known and reputable Python packages from standard registries, including
pdfplumber,pypdf,pillow,pytesseract,pandas,pdf2image,jsonschema, andopenpyxl. It also references official system package installation for Tesseract OCR viabrew(macOS) andapt-get(Ubuntu), as well as the official Tesseract Windows binaries repository on GitHub. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation and examples demonstrate the use of
subprocess.runand CLI commands to execute its own internal scripts (e.g.,scripts/analyze_form.py,scripts/fill_form.py). This is standard functionality for a script-based processing toolkit and does not involve arbitrary command execution or suspicious shell piping. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data from external PDF files via extraction scripts in
SKILL.md,FORMS.md,TABLES.md, andOCR.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit instructions or delimiters are provided to the agent to distinguish between the extracted PDF data and control instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute subprocess calls (
subprocess.run) and perform file system operations (read/write). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the extracted PDF content before it is processed by the agent. This represents a potential attack surface if a malicious PDF contains instructions designed to manipulate the agent's behavior after text extraction.
Audit Metadata