pet-commerce-creator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface because it downloads and parses metadata (titles, descriptions, tags) from external video platforms (via
scripts/video_downloader.py) and feeds this untrusted data into its "Explosion Analysis" agent. An attacker could potentially craft video metadata that attempts to manipulate the agent's output during the script creation phase. - Ingestion points: Video titles, descriptions, and tags extracted from user-supplied URLs in
scripts/video_downloader.pyand processed inreferences/agents-prompts.md. - Boundary markers: The prompt instructions lack explicit boundary markers or warnings to the agent to disregard instructions embedded in the analyzed video data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities for file system writes (
./downloads), network operations (Coze API interactions), and multi-agent coordination. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the external metadata before it is interpolated into the agent's context.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses the standard
yt-dlplibrary to fetch media and metadata from external sources. This is a core part of the skill's functionality for analyzing viral content and is considered a legitimate use of network resources. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill involves executing specific local scripts (
scripts/video_downloader.pyandscripts/coze_video_api.py) to perform its tasks. These executions are constrained to the skill's own internal tools and follow best practices for secret management by using environment variables for API credentials.
Audit Metadata