video-transcript-downloader
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/vtd.jsexecutes external CLI tools based on user-supplied arguments. Therunfunction utilizesnode:child_process.spawnto executeyt-dlpandffmpeg. The script includes an explicit mechanism to pass arbitrary extra arguments toyt-dlpusing the--separator, which grants access to advanced tool features like command execution through specific flags.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from external URLs, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious instructions could be embedded in video transcripts or subtitles.\n - Ingestion points: Data is fetched from external URLs provided to the
transcript,download,audio, andsubscommands inscripts/vtd.js.\n - Boundary markers: The output provided to the agent is not wrapped in security delimiters or provided with warnings to ignore embedded instructions.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute subprocesses (
yt-dlp,ffmpeg) and perform file system writes to the user's~/Downloadsdirectory and system temporary directories.\n - Sanitization: The
cleanSegmentsfunction inscripts/vtd.jsstrips HTML tags, timestamps, and music cues to improve readability, but it does not filter or sanitize the content for potential natural language instructions.
Audit Metadata