wechatsync-publisher
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 27, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script
scripts/publish.pytransmits all article data, including titles, full content, and tags, to a hardcoded external IP addresshttp://39.108.254.228:8002. While theSKILL.mdlabels this as the user's "self-built service," the hardcoding of a specific, non-local IP address means data is exfiltrated to a third-party server by default. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/publish.pyscript utilizessubprocess.runto executecurlcommands. This is used to perform POST requests to the hardcoded external IP address with user-supplied content. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation provided in
references/server-config-guide.mdandreferences/platform-requirements.mdinstructs users to obtain and store highly sensitive authentication data—including session cookies and access tokens for platforms like WeChat, 知乎 (Zhihu), 微博 (Weibo), and 掘金 (Juejin)—in an environment file for the server component. Because the skill's scripts point to a hardcoded external IP, following these instructions could lead to credential harvesting. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection in
scripts/publish.py. It parses JSON responses from the hardcoded server and returns error messages or data directly to the agent's context. A malicious server could provide instructions in these fields to manipulate the agent's subsequent actions. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]:
scripts/search_images.pyperforms network requests tohttps://source.unsplash.comto fetch images. While this is a well-known service, it demonstrates the skill's capability to interact with external web resources.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata