discuss-idea
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands (e.g.,
grep,sort) using a<resource-slug>variable in Step 2. If this identifier is derived from untrusted input or manipulated by a user, it could lead to command injection or unauthorized reading of files on the system. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In Step 7, the skill directs the agent to derive filenames directly from user-provided "claim text." The absence of sanitization requirements or path validation creates a risk of path traversal, potentially allowing an attacker to overwrite sensitive files or create files outside the designated vault directory.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through its ingestion of CSV data.
- Ingestion points: Data is read from
.agents/slipbox/candidates/*.csvfiles to drive the selection and discussion process (Step 2). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore malicious content embedded within the CSV fields (such as the
reasonfield populated by other skills). - Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands (
grep,sort) and perform file system writes (Step 7 and 8). - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of external data is specified before it is used to influence agent behavior or file operations.
Audit Metadata