clip-resource
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external CLI tools including
defuddleandfirecrawlvia shell commands to parse web content. - Evidence:
defuddle parse "<url>" --markdownandfirecrawl scrape "<url>" --only-main-contentinreferences/extract-article-news.md. - Mitigation: The skill includes explicit instructions in
SKILL.mdfor the agent to reject URLs containing shell metacharacters (quotes, backticks,$,;,|,&,<,>, newlines) and to pass URLs as single quoted arguments to prevent injection. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill fetches content from user-provided URLs and processes it using natural language instructions defined in templates.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted content is fetched from external URLs (articles, social threads, etc.) via tools like Firecrawl, TinyFish, and Defuddle.
- Boundary markers: The skill checkpoints raw content into
extraction.jsonand stages adraft.mdbefore publication, though it does not specify explicit LLM-level delimiters for the untrusted content within the prompt context. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write files to the
/using-slipboxdirectory and execute local CLI tools. - Sanitization: The skill implements a
/write-checksgate for synthesized content (quoted instructions) which applies 'Style' and 'Humanize' checks, and it enforces strict URL parsing to prevent shell-level exploits. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill interacts with external services to fetch data.
- Evidence: Uses Firecrawl for scraping and the
youtube-transcript-apito fetch video data from YouTube. These are well-known services for web data extraction.
Audit Metadata