video-viewing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/download_video.pyusessubprocess.runto executeffmpegandffprobefor metadata extraction and frame generation. While arguments are passed as a list to mitigate shell injection, the skill relies on executing external system binaries to process user-provided video files. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The script
scripts/download_video.pycontains a mechanism to dynamically install therequestsPython package at runtime usingpipif it is not already present in the environment. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The
SKILL.mdfile provides specific instructions for the user or agent to runsudo apt-get install ffmpegto fulfill the skill's requirements. Instructions to usesudoare flagged as they encourage elevated permission usage. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted video data from external URLs.
- Ingestion points: Video data is fetched via
requests.getinscripts/download_video.py. - Boundary markers: None present; there are no instructions to the agent to disregard potential instructions embedded in video metadata or visual frames.
- Capability inventory: The script can perform network downloads, file system writes (
/mnt/user-data/outputs), and execute system commands viasubprocess. - Sanitization: Shell injection is mitigated by using list-based arguments for
subprocess.run, but the content of the video (frames/metadata) is intended for agent analysis, creating a surface for indirect influence.
Audit Metadata