and-workflow-contract

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 10, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and acts upon untrusted data from GitHub issues and comments to drive core workflow operations.
  • Ingestion points: GitHub issue bodies and comment streams, as described in SKILL.md, delivery-units.md, and local-cleanup.md.
  • Boundary markers: The system uses specific markdown headers (e.g., ## Implementation, Cleanup: required) and fenced JSON blocks to delimit authoritative instructions, though these do not fully prevent adversarial content from influencing the agent's interpretation.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can perform GitHub API operations (via gh api), Docker container and volume management (via docker-compose), and local file system analysis.
  • Sanitization: Validation logic exists in review-attestation.sh to enforce canonical data formats, and local-cleanup.md provides explicit negative constraints (e.g., forbidding prune or globs) to mitigate command injection risks.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions and a bash script (review-attestation.sh) for the agent to execute shell commands. These include gh api for GitHub interactions, docker-compose for local resource cleanup, and git for diffing commits. These tools are used for their intended workflow purposes, but provide a powerful execution capability that relies on the accuracy of the input data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 10, 2026, 06:02 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — and-workflow-contract