and-workflow-contract
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and acts upon untrusted data from GitHub issues and comments to drive core workflow operations.
- Ingestion points: GitHub issue bodies and comment streams, as described in
SKILL.md,delivery-units.md, andlocal-cleanup.md. - Boundary markers: The system uses specific markdown headers (e.g.,
## Implementation,Cleanup: required) and fenced JSON blocks to delimit authoritative instructions, though these do not fully prevent adversarial content from influencing the agent's interpretation. - Capability inventory: The agent can perform GitHub API operations (via
gh api), Docker container and volume management (viadocker-compose), and local file system analysis. - Sanitization: Validation logic exists in
review-attestation.shto enforce canonical data formats, andlocal-cleanup.mdprovides explicit negative constraints (e.g., forbiddingpruneor globs) to mitigate command injection risks. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions and a bash script (
review-attestation.sh) for the agent to execute shell commands. These includegh apifor GitHub interactions,docker-composefor local resource cleanup, andgitfor diffing commits. These tools are used for their intended workflow purposes, but provide a powerful execution capability that relies on the accuracy of the input data.
Audit Metadata