codex-pr-review-loop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection by processing external data from GitHub PRs to drive automated actions.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via GitHub PR reviews, review comments, and ordinary comments collected in Step 5.
- Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions to wrap external content in delimiters or treat it as untrusted, although Step 6 involves a triage process.
- Capability inventory: Across its operations, the skill can execute subprocesses for testing (e.g., pnpm verify, Docker builds), perform file-system writes for code repairs, and execute network operations via the gh CLI or git.
- Sanitization: The skill lacks explicit sanitization or escaping of the ingested content, relying on the agent's triage logic and user-intervention checkpoints for subjective decisions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs local command execution as part of its verification and repair loop.
- Evidence: Step 8 and the Polling Discipline section detail the use of pnpm verify, E2E tests, and Docker builds to validate fixes.
- Context: These are legitimate development operations but represent the capability tier accessible to potential indirect injection attacks.
Audit Metadata