pptx
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pygenerates C source code from a hardcoded string at runtime and compiles it usinggccinto a shared object library. This allow the creation of arbitrary native code. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pyutilizes theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable to inject the compiled shared library into thesoffice(LibreOffice) process execution. This mechanism is used to intercept system calls and modify process behavior at a low level. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts (
scripts/pptx_render.py,scripts/thumbnail.py,scripts/office/soffice.py,scripts/office/validators/redlining.py) usesubprocess.runto execute system tools likelibreoffice,pdftoppm,gcc, andgitfor rendering, file conversion, and comparison tasks. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests untrusted data from PowerPoint files.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted text and media are read in
scripts/pptx_text.pyandscripts/pptx_modify.py. - Boundary markers: Absent when text is presented to the agent for summarization or inspection.
- Capability inventory: Use of
subprocess.runinscripts/pptx_render.pyandscripts/thumbnail.pyprovides an exploitation path if the agent is manipulated. - Sanitization: The skill uses
defusedxmlfor secure XML parsing, which mitigates XML-based attacks but not logical prompt injection.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata