skills/andreacovelli/my-skills/pptx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

pptx

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/office/soffice.py generates C source code from a hardcoded string at runtime and compiles it using gcc into a shared object library. This allow the creation of arbitrary native code.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/office/soffice.py utilizes the LD_PRELOAD environment variable to inject the compiled shared library into the soffice (LibreOffice) process execution. This mechanism is used to intercept system calls and modify process behavior at a low level.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts (scripts/pptx_render.py, scripts/thumbnail.py, scripts/office/soffice.py, scripts/office/validators/redlining.py) use subprocess.run to execute system tools like libreoffice, pdftoppm, gcc, and git for rendering, file conversion, and comparison tasks.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests untrusted data from PowerPoint files.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted text and media are read in scripts/pptx_text.py and scripts/pptx_modify.py.
  • Boundary markers: Absent when text is presented to the agent for summarization or inspection.
  • Capability inventory: Use of subprocess.run in scripts/pptx_render.py and scripts/thumbnail.py provides an exploitation path if the agent is manipulated.
  • Sanitization: The skill uses defusedxml for secure XML parsing, which mitigates XML-based attacks but not logical prompt injection.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jun 23, 2026, 12:22 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — pptx