academic
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill automatically loads and trusts project-level configuration files and custom agent definitions without explicit sanitization, which could be exploited by malicious content within a project repository.
- Ingestion points: Reads
.claude/CLAUDE.md,.claude/agents/*.md, and.texfiles from the working directory as described in the context loading section ofSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Does not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when passing untrusted file content to sub-agent prompts.
- Capability inventory: The orchestrator and its sub-agents have access to powerful tools including
Bash,Edit,Write,WebFetch, andWebSearch. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating markdown content or frontmatter from project-specific agent definitions before they are added to the active roster.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool for project-related shell commands. - Evidence: The 'Incremental Review' section in
SKILL.mdexplicitly calls for runninggit diff --name-onlyto identify changed files. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to interact with research APIs.
- Evidence: The
paper-crawleragent is designed to collect data from DBLP and OpenAlex APIs using theWebFetchtool. These are well-known academic services and the use is consistent with the skill's primary purpose.
Audit Metadata