agentic-linter

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from local files and architectural guidelines while maintaining the capability to modify the file system through code refactoring.
  • Ingestion points: Reads architectural rules from AGENTS.md and project source files across various directories including src/, domain/, and infrastructure/ (Step 1, Step 2).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any boundary markers or directives for the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the analyzed source code.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is authorized to perform structural file modifications, including creating new interface files, updating existing implementations, and generating configuration files (Step 5, Step 7).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization process is described for the content read from external files before it is used to influence the agent's refactoring and code generation logic.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates executable configuration files and references dynamic code evaluation.
  • Evidence: The agent is instructed to generate a .dependency-cruiser.cjs JavaScript configuration file (Step 7). The security section also explicitly mentions dynamic evaluation of code to trace imports.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell commands to perform linting and dependency analysis.
  • Evidence: Uses npx madge, npx dependency-cruiser, vendor/bin/deptrac, and lint-imports (Step 2).
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The use of npx for linting tools involves the potential download and execution of packages from the npm registry.
  • Evidence: Execution of npx madge and npx dependency-cruiser.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 14, 2026, 02:43 PM