loki-mode
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill orchestrates a multi-agent swarm that ingests untrusted data from project files and external research, creating a surface for indirect instructions.
- Ingestion points: The orchestrator utilizes
knowledge-connect.skillto retrieve external data snippets for task context during Phase S05, andorch-researcherfor discovery in Phase S00. - Boundary markers: The framework enforces mandatory "HUMAN APPROVAL REQUIRED" gates at critical SDLC transitions (S00, S01, S02, S07, S08) to prevent autonomous phase advancement without user verification.
- Capability inventory: The system has extensive access to the local filesystem for state preservation in
agents/memory/, autonomous code remediation tools, and deployment scripts. - Sanitization: The instructions mandate the use of
safety-scan.skillandai-safety-guardrails.skill(Phase S07) to verify inputs and sub-agent security postures. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The orchestration loop includes the
meta-optimize.skill(Phase S05), which is described as being able to "Rewrite the failing skill/prompt" at runtime as part of a "Self-Evolution" mechanism for failed tasks. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The implementation phase (S05) employs autonomous remediation tools like
ci-autofixandself-heal.skillto correct code errors and satisfy compiler requirements during build cycles. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill describes "Tactic B" for subagent delegation, which involves generating a
delegation-payload.mdfile intended to be manually transferred by the user to external, isolated LLM instances. While this process is human-mediated, it represents a design pattern for moving internal context to external environments.
Audit Metadata