self-optimize
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from
project/gabbe.config.jsonand user task intent to determine operational posture. - Ingestion points: Reads configuration parameters and budget limits from
project/gabbe.config.jsonand task descriptions from the user. - Boundary markers: The skill specifies that the configuration must be validated against expected types and values, and uses a structured output format for decisions.
- Capability inventory: Accesses the file system (via MCP) to read config and write to
AUDIT_LOG.md; coordinates the execution of other skills and model selection. - Sanitization: Explicitly includes a security section stating that hostile or malformed configs must fall back to safe defaults and cannot override safety gates or autonomy levels.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The configuration example references external registries for skills, including a repository from Google (a well-known service) and
https://skills.sh. - The skill mitigates risks associated with these downloads by explicitly requiring human approval for any actions involving externally-sourced code, regardless of the autonomy level.
- [SAFE]: The core logic of the skill is defensive, emphasizing 'most-restrictive-wins' for alignment and auditable decision-making. It contains specific instructions to ignore prompt injections that attempt to escalate privileges or bypass constraints.
Audit Metadata