absorb
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from git repositories and local paths to extract AI-harness practices, creating a surface for embedded instructions to influence the agent.
- Ingestion points: External file content is read and mapped in
SKILL.md(Workflow steps 1 and 2). - Boundary markers: The skill includes 'Hard Rules' to ignore README claims, but it lacks specific prompt delimiters to separate external data from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities to clone repositories, read arbitrary files, and write analysis reports to the local filesystem (
.ai/absorb/). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of the content extracted from external targets before it is processed by the agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads content from external git repositories provided by the user.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdworkflow step 1: 'If it is a git URL, clone or update it only with user awareness'. - Context: This behavior is the primary intended purpose of the skill.
Audit Metadata