workflow-callstack-simulation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses untrusted inputs (prose or repository files) as the source for simulations, which creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection. A malicious target input could contain embedded instructions designed to manipulate the agent's behavior during the simulation process.
- Ingestion points: The
Targetinput defined inSKILL.mdallows the agent to ingest arbitrary text or the contents of files within the repository. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or clear boundary markers to isolate the
Targetcontent from the agent's own instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for reading arbitrary repository-relative files and writing the simulation output to a user-defined Markdown file (
SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There is no requirement in the procedure to sanitize, validate, or escape the content of the
Targetinput before it is processed. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill allows the agent to read repository-relative files to act as the authoritative source for a simulation. This functionality enables the potential exposure of sensitive files—such as environment variables, configuration files, or credentials—if they are located within the accessible repository structure.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a step to write the generated callstack to a 'resolved destination' within the repository. This file-writing capability represents a potential attack surface if an adversary can influence the destination path or the content being written through a malicious
Targetinput.
Audit Metadata