adaptogen-critique
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill spawns a sub-agent using the
Agenttool and populates its prompt with a verbatim copy of a previous run's report, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: The template in
SKILL.md(Step 1 under 'Do this') includes a placeholder<PASTE HERE>for the previous run's full report. - Boundary markers: The prompt uses weak markers (square brackets and a colon) to delineate the untrusted content, which is insufficient to prevent an LLM from obeying instructions embedded within the report data.
- Capability inventory: The sub-agent is granted access to the
Read,Bash, andAgenttools, which could be leveraged if an injection is successful. - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or explicit 'ignore instructions' warnings are applied to the interpolated report data.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to perform git-related operations to verify findings against the project's history. - Evidence: Step 3 in
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to usegrepongit logand commit messages to verify if a failure has occurred in previous runs.
Audit Metadata