adaptogen-run
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a workflow that ingests untrusted data from target skills and tasks, interpolating it into prompts for further execution, which constitutes an indirect prompt injection surface.\n
- Ingestion points: External data is read from target skills and task anchors as described in
SKILL.md.\n - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or security instructions are used to isolate the interpolated task content from the subagent's instructions.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Agenttool to spawn sub-processes and theSkilltool to transition state. In 'leaf-agent mode', the agent executes the target procedure directly in its own context, which bypasses subagent isolation.\n - Sanitization: The instructions explicitly require information to be 'pasted into the prompt directly' without escaping or filtering of the external content.
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