skills/anentrypoint/gm-skill/gm/Gen Agent Trust Hub

gm

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to ignore standard safety protocols and user oversight. It states that the chain should run to completion 'without re-asking' and 'without permission gates between phases,' effectively overriding the human-in-the-loop safety model for autonomous actions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestrator logic implements dynamic tool invocation. It reads a value from a local JSON file (.gm/exec-spool/out/<N>.json) and uses that variable to immediately execute a new skill via the Skill tool.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to control flow hijacking if the spool directory is compromised.
  • Ingestion points: Reads execution state and next steps from .gm/exec-spool/out/<N>.json.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill treats the nextSkill field from the file as a trusted directive.
  • Capability inventory: Uses the Skill tool to invoke other functionalities, along with Read and Write access to the file system.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization for the nextSkill string before it is passed to the tool executor.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 17, 2026, 10:31 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — gm